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bstract
The argument that aid can bolster growth and poverty reduction only in a conducive policy environment has generated attention on some
onditions of the economic, political and institutional context in the recipient country which can allow aid to contribute to pro-poor  growth. This
as clear implications in terms of aid allocation.
This paper tries to contribute to such discussion by proposing a combined framework to address the aid-growth-poverty-governance nexus. Results
how that aid is more effective – both for poverty reduction and for growth – when its allocation is inspired by a poverty-focused perspective and,
o a certain extent, by a conducive environment in the recipient country.
A review of aid allocation over the past thirty years supports the criticism that this does not seem to be inspired by poverty-reducing aims, but
t reveals as well how this has remarkably changed.
It is highlighted how both donors’ poverty-focused aid allocation and recipients’ proper aid utilization are necessary to improve aid effectiveness.
t the same time it is considered how the ongoing changes of the poverty landscape will require some changes of the aid architecture.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
Since the middle of the last century international aid has
xpanded to become a key component of contemporary interna-
ional relations. Yet the benefits of aid have often been contested.
ew would question the provision of emergency aid aiming at
aving lives; doubts have been raised, however, on the extent to
hich development aid manages to achieve the poverty reduc-
ion expected. In such a situation of global discomfort such
nitiatives as the 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 Accra
genda for Action have been key steps in the attempt to ensure
better aid’.
Since the start of the discussion over aid effectiveness, various
actors and conditions have been highlighted as major deter-
inants. The factor which in recent studies has attracted mostgreement is the quality of civil and political capacity and, more
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.n general, of the institutional environment in the recipient coun-
ry. This has led to calls for some substantial adjustment of the
ong criticized aid allocation criteria.
The present analysis provides a contribution to the discus-
ion drawing together insights from a plurality of perspectives
n order to analyze the overall aid-growth-poverty-governance
exus. The methodological and empirical sections are arranged
n two parts. The first part develops a systemic framework in
rder to highlight the various aid-related links, with particular
ocus on the relevance of poverty and governance on the alloca-
ion of aid. The second part is focused on the allocation of aid
nd its evolution.
.  Literature  review
The impact of aid on poverty is quite heterogeneous and, as
egnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003) put it, it is
till something of an enigma. While most of the analysis has
raditionally focused on the effectiveness of aid on growth, it
s only with the establishment of the Millennium Development
oals (MDGs) that more focused analysis has been conducted
n specific aspects of human development and poverty reduc-
ion. Masud and Yontcheva (2005) find aid to significantly affect
ortality rates, while its effect on education seems to be less rele-
ant. Furthermore, this is achieved without drastically crowding
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ut government expenditure. The analysis of the effectiveness
f aid on poverty reduction is hampered by lack of knowledge
n how great the share of aid is that is aimed directly towards
he poor. According to Baulch (1996) in the case of low income
ountries such a share is at most 15–20%. According to Asra
t al. (2005), aid appears to have a positive impact on poverty
eduction, but with diminishing returns, with the critical value
f effectiveness set by the absorptive capacity of the country
oncerned.
Despite the new international perspective on development,
hich has shifted from a focus on growth to one on poverty
eduction, Heltburg (2004) argues that economic growth is ‘.  . .in
ractice, the main tool for fighting poverty.’ From such a per-
pective, growth is still the necessary interface between aid and
overty or its various sectoral dimensions. In other words, the
eal focus is the growth elasticity of poverty reduction, and
he recognition that different types of economic growth have
ifferent effects on inequality and thus poverty reduction.
Exploring the neoliberal view of governments acting as a con-
traint to development, Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier
nd Dollar (2001, 2002) show how aid can bolster growth, but
nly in a conducive policy environment. This positive condition
equires governments to create sound macroeconomic policies in
ine with market-oriented and liberal views. Similarly, Gomanee
t al. (2003) and Mosley et al. (2004) tackle the fungibility of
id and conclude that aid can contribute to increase welfare
nly if it manages to raise the budget allocated to pro-poor
xpenditures. Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) suggest that aid
ffectiveness is linked to political stability and Kosack (2003)
oncludes that aid’s capacity to improve human welfare is effec-
ive only in democratic political conditions. The last point recalls
trongly the many studies highlighting the relevance of policy
or growth.1 Burnside and Dollar (2004) find strong evidence
hat institutional quality is a determinant for aid effectiveness.
erschoor and Kalwij (2006) argue that aid can contribute not
ust to growth but also to pro-poor  growth, suggesting that both
id itself and a recipient government’s budget share allocated to
ocial services tend to increase the income elasticity of poverty,
nd that, moreover, aid tends to increase this budget share. Asra
t al. (2005) suggest that the impact of aid is not contingent upon
he quality of governance and macroeconomic policy, although
he latter is relevant for poverty reduction.
From a reciprocal perspective, that is about the capac-
ty of aid to affect policy, Lele and Nabi (1991) assert that
id improves economic policies, while Burnside and Dollar
2000) and Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) claim that aid is
1 It is also worth mentioning how in this respect findings are far from being
ncontroversial. Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) conclude that ‘. . . democratization
omes at no discernible costs in terms of growth, and with likely benefits in
he form of a short-run boost in growth and reduction in economic volatility’.
arro (1996) postulates that, holding other things constant, there are positive
ut diminishing returns to democracy. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), taking into
ccount the entire system, identify a slight negative impact of democracy on
rowth, mainly through physical capital accumulation. Gerring et al. (2005)
rgue that the ‘effect of regime type on growth is mediated by a country’s secular-
istorical experience of democracy and authoritarianism’.
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neffective, despite any effort to make it conditional upon certain
ehaviours.2
In general, in a conducive policy environment good gover-
ance has multiple possible manifestations, ranging from civil
nd political liberties, to sound economic policy, lack of cor-
uption and solidity of institutions. Most aid-growth regressions
nclude an index of trade openness as a specific aspect of pol-
cy. Asra et al. (2005) find that more openness helps accelerate
overty reduction.
Some identify the problem of absorption capacity as one of
he major constraints to aid effectiveness. In particular, it is often
rgued that those who need external assistance most are often
he ones least able to use it effectively.3
Feeny and McGillivray (2009) focus on the effectiveness of
id in the so-called fragile  states  and find that the situation
s rather diversified, with a number of fragile states capa-
le of efficiently absorbing more aid than they have received,
hile a number receive far more aid than they can efficiently
bsorb.
It has been shown that the analysis of aid effectiveness is
ar from reaching a consensus and this leads to the need to
efine the analysis. At the same time the subject is of high
olicy relevance, because of its implications in terms of aid
llocation.
Trumball and Wall (1994) find needs and human rights as
eterminants of aid allocation. In contrast, Alesina and Dollar
2000) highlight the relevance of colonial ties.
Some views assume that allocation depends on need
nd effectiveness, typically identified with governance, but
xpressed with different measures, as shown by Amprou et al.
2007). The consideration of the role played by the good pol-
cy environment mentioned above has led to a certain advocacy
or performance-based selectivity, stressing an assumed higher
ffectiveness of aid on poverty reduction in the presence of
riendly and committed governments. From such a perspective,
ollier and Dollar (2001) compare actual with poverty- and
olicy-efficient aid allocations, estimating a substantial increase
n the number of people that could be lifted out of poverty
hrough the latter system. Interestingly, the main reallocation
roposed is not from poor- to good-policy countries, but from
iddle-income countries to low-income countries. This pro-
osal was based on the consideration that most of the world’s
oor used to live in countries with high poverty and good poli-
ies; however, shifts in the global poverty landscape away from
table low-income environments urge new strategies.
McGillivray et al. (2006) call for further investigation of
he link between policy and aid effectiveness through a better
nderstanding of the transmission mechanisms, while arguing
or a broad selectivity approach combining policy with a num-
er of other contingencies such as political stability, democracy
2 The justification of conditionality is that aid is thought to improve policy.
he mechanism by which this works is thought to be two-fold. First, aid can be
sed to ‘reward’ countries that have good policies, and thus incentivize policy
hanges for other countries. Second, aid is thought to work as a ‘catalyst’ for
olicy changes.
3 See Clemens et al. (2012) among others.
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such constraint mainly through the use of proxies, such as life
expectancy, the human development index (HDI), infant mortal-
ity, or others. This study makes use of poverty data. Under the
4 In favour of a per capita approach see Arndt et al. (2010) and Berthelemy and
Tichit (2004) among others. For a different view see McGillivray and Oczkowski
(1992) among others.
5 In some studies a different measure of aid has been used: Effective Devel-
opment Assistance (EDA). While ODA provides a measure of actual financial
transfer to a country and includes both grants and concessional loans net of
repayment of previous aid loans, EDA focuses on the overall grant equivalence
of official financial flows and excludes the loan component of concessional loans.A. De Matteis / Review of Dev
nd structural vulnerability. According to Degnbol-Martinussen
nd Engberg-Pedersen (2003), reallocating aid to low-income
ountries with the largest number of poor people would be more
ffective than a reallocation based only on the quality of poli-
ies and institutions. Anderson and Waddington (2007) go a step
urther and offer advice on which type of poverty-based realloca-
ion could be more effective: a poverty-gap-efficient allocation
ould be preferable than a country-by-country poverty target
llocation and a poverty-headcount-efficient one, since in the
ormer case it would allow ceteris paribus a larger reduction in
overty headcount at global level, and in the latter case it would
chieve a larger reduction in the depth of poverty at the global
evel.
.  Methodology
.1.  A  systemic  approach
The relevance of aid on poverty reduction can be presented
n simple terms as follows:
overty reduction =  α0 +  α1 (Initial conditions) +  α2 Aid (1)
Eq. (1) implies the assumption that all its right-hand-side vari-
bles are exogenous. However, very likely this is not the case,
ince poverty and aid may be expected to be determined simul-
aneously. In fact, while we want to test whether aid contributes
o reduce poverty, it also needs to be considered how poverty
evels may play an important role in aid allocation. Therefore,
his analysis makes use of simultaneous equations in order to
ake account of problems of endogeneity while trying to capture
ore accurately estimates of the role of each variable within
he system. Four equations are estimated: Aid allocation, Eco-
omic growth, Poverty reduction and Governance change. For
ach equation different specifications have been considered in
rder to test robustness. The analysis is arranged into five-year
ags, in which the dependant variables, all in the year t5, are
xpected to be determined by their value, as well as the value of
ther variables, in the year t and by the flows of aid and rates of
rowth occurred within the period t–t5. The following equations
ave been estimated:
idt5 =  α0 +  α1 Povertyt +  α2 Populationt
+  α3 GDPt +  α4 Governancet (2)
DPt5 =  β0 +  β1 Aidt−t5 +  β2 Governancet +  β3 Geography
+ β4 Opennesst +  β5 Ethnic fragmentation (3)
overty =  χ0 +  χ1 Aidt−t5 +  χ2 GDPt−t5 (4)t5
overnancet5 =  δ0 +  δ1 Aidt−t5 +  δ2 GDPt−t5
+  δ3 Geography +  δ4 Opennesst
+  δ5 Ethnic fragmentation (5)
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In Eq. (2) the value of aid in the year t5 is expected to be
etermined mainly by the levels of poverty and GDP per  capita
n the year t. The inclusion of the variable population tries to
est the eventual presence of a population bias in the process of
id allocation. Finally, the variable governance will consider the
elevance of the recent characteristics and eventual changes of
he institutional environment in the recipient country.
In Eq. (3) GDP per  capita  is expected to be determined by
ome structural characteristics, exemplified by the invariant vari-
bles geography and ethnic fragmentation and by political and
nstitutional variables, such as in this case, openness to the global
arket as well as domestic civil and political liberties. The aim
f Eq. (3) is to assess the relevance of average amounts of aid
eceived during the period t–t5 in affecting the change in GDP
er capita  through the period considered.
Eq. (4) allows a direct comparison between the two flows (aid
nd GDP, both in per  capita  terms) experienced by a recipient
ountry during the period t–t5 in terms of their relevance for
overty reduction.
Finally, Eq. (5) combines aid and GDP flows with struc-
ural characteristics (geography and ethnic fragmentation) and
he degree of country openness to the global market, as major
eterminants of governance.
Aid is expressed on a per  capita  basis, rather than as a per-
entage of GDP, as done in other studies. This reflects well
he explicit aid allocation rules used by donors.4 In fact, when
onsidering the impact of aid on poverty, it is rather the aver-
ge amount allocated per  poor  which should be used, but when
onsidering the impact of aid on growth, the average per  capita
s considered as more appropriate. Furthermore, the use of aid
er capita  is expected to be more sensible in the investigation
f eventual size bias in aid allocation.
As a measure of aid we make use of constant Official Devel-
pment Assistance (ODA).5 6
Growth is expressed in terms of constant GDP per  capita.
In Eqs. (3) and (5) poverty is expressed in absolute terms: i.e.
s the number of individuals who are below the poverty line – set
t two dollars a day expressed in PPP terms. Datasets of poverty
re rather scanty and previous studies have tried to overcomes Asra et al. (2005) put it, the main difference between the two measures is
hat EDA is the sum of grants and grant equivalents of official loans and ODA
s the sum of grants and loans for which the grant element is more than 25%. As
oted by Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), the difference between the two measures
ppears to be no more than a simple mathematical transformation.
6 The data is drawn from The World Bank, World Development Indicators, and
omes ultimately from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System database.
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onsideration that poverty adjusts slowly to underlying factors,
n this study missing values in the poverty dataset have been
artly estimated through linear interpolation.7
Nevertheless, it is noted that headcount poverty measures
ay not clearly identify the proportion of population below a
xed absolute consumption level over time (Reddy and Pogge,
005; Ravallion, 2008).
In terms of governance, the major difficulty lies in deciding
hich proxy to use. The dimension considered in this analysis
s not focused upon the macroeconomic spectrum as in other
tudies, but rather upon the civil and political environment in
he recipient country.
In order to widen the spectrum of possible links between aid
nd governance, each variable is included into the other variable
quation. In fact, the mechanism through which aid is thought
o improve governance and policy in general can be twofold: aid
an be used as a ‘catalyst’ for changes or as a ‘reward’ for the
doption of appropriate measures.
Civil and political liberties are expressed by the index POL-
IV which has been constructed from data from Freedom House,
reedom in  the  World. The dataset scores for civil and political
iberties are two categorical indexes ranging between 1 and 7.
or ease of interpretation in this study the original scores have
een inverted; such operation retains the original domain of the
ndexes. The index POLCIV used in this study is the average of
he two scores.8 9
The inclusion of ethnic fragmentation is based on the social
onflict theory of the origin of institutions, according to which
ad institutions exist if ‘the groups with political power benefit
rom bad institutions’ (Acemoglu et  al., 2004). From such a
erspective, ‘ethnic diversity may increase polarization and . . .
reate rents for the groups in power at the expenses of society at
arge’ (Easterly and Levine, 1997).10
Geography is expressed as latitude squared.11
As common in most aid-growth regressions, openness is
xpressed by the Sachs-Warner variable, which is a dummy for
hether a country is open to international trade or not.12
Data on ethnic fragmentation, geography and openness has
een extracted from the dataset used in Roodman (2004). Unless
therwise specified, the data used for the other variables in this
7 All necessary caution has been taken in the process of applying linear inter-
olation. Most of the gaps filled range between two and three years and never
ore than five years. Furthermore, interpolation has been applied only in the
resence of a clear trend.
8 That is: POLCIV = |Average (Freedom House Indexes) − 8|.
9 Other proxies, such as the Kaufman’s World Governance Indicators and the
orld Bank CPIA measures could provide valid alternatives to the POLCIV
ndex. Nevertheless, the latter is preferred here in view of its longer timeframe,
hich helps to optimize the dataset used in the study.
10 As a reminder of the relevance of ethnic fragmentation in the process of
rowth it is worth considering how Easterly and Levine (1997) found that ‘ethnic
iversity alone accounts for about 28 per cent of the growth differential between
he countries of Africa and East Asia’.
11 As an alternative, the percentage of land in the tropics, also popular in the
iterature, has been used for robustness tests and has provided similar results.
12 While such a measure is quite simplistic, it is a better reflection of economic
olicy than other measures based on export and import performance.
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nalysis has been sourced from the World Bank, World  Devel-
pment  Indicators.
The dataset is formed by 78 countries and covers the period
980–2008.13 It is acknowledged that the panel structure of the
ataset raises the problem of aggregation, which has regularly
iased the aid-growth-poverty thesis.14
.2.  Aid  allocation
The methodology used here to examine the allocation of aid
akes use of the Suits index which summarizes the progressivity
r regressivity of a distribution. White and McGillivray (1995)
ecommend the use of the Suits index after examining various
ossible summary measures of donors’ allocative performance.
t has been used to assess the distribution of aid against the
opulation of developing countries and against the population
f the world’s extreme poor (Baulch, 2003) as well as against
on-monetary indicators of poverty (Baulch, 2004).
For a continuous distribution the Suits index is calculated as:
d =  1 − 1
K
100∫
0
Ai(y)dy  (6)
here Sd is the Suits index for donor d, Ai is the cumulative
istribution of aid ranked in terms of per  capita  income y.
For a discrete distribution Eq. (6) can be approximated as
ollows:
d =  1 −
∑
pi (CAi +  CAi−1) (7)
here pi is the population share of country i  and CAi is the
umulative aid share of country i and of all poorer countries.
The Suits index is an analogue of the Gini coefficient, but in
his case the index ranges between −1 and +1. A Suits index of
1 would correspond to the case in which donor d  were to give
ll its aid to the poorest country in the world, while a value of
1 would correspond to the case in which donor d  were to give
ll its aid to the richest country among the ones recipients of aid.
inally, a Suits index of zero would correspond to the situationn which donor d were to distribute its aid in exact proportion
o population with no reference to the different levels of per
apita income. In general terms, positive values of the Suits
13 Countries in the sample: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbai-
an, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
ameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
ote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
ador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
uyana, Honduras, India, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz
epublic, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania,
exico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
igeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa,
ri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
ruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.
14 It is acknowledged that aggregating for analytical purposes different
ountries over different economic periods could be problematic, since some
ountries may be experiencing either a favourable phase or a severe crisis, while
thers not.
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Table 1
The aid-growth-poverty-governance system.
[2] [3] [4] [5]
dep. var. lODAt5 lGDPt5 lPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt 0.015 lODAavg −0.277*** lODAavg −0.080*** lODAavg 0.102**
1Populationt −0.625*** Latitude −0.015*** lGDPavg −0.696* lGDPavg 0.360***
lGDPt −0.549*** Opennesst 0.588*** Constant 8.459*** Latitude −0.026***
POLCIVt 0.023 Ethnic −1.733*** Opennesst 0.507***
Constant 16.720*** Constant 8.360*** Ethnic −0.435*
Constant 1.603***
Pseudo R2 0.630 0.350 0.760 0.316
N. obs. 549 549 549 549
Source: Author’s estimation.
* Significance = 10%.
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a** Significance = 5%.
** Significance = 1%.
ndex identify a more or less regressive allocation of aid, while
egative values identify a more or less progressive allocation.
.  Findings  and  discussion
In line with the systemic approach presented earlier on, a sys-
em of simultaneous equations has been applied and results are
eported in Table 1 which combines the Eqs. (2)–(5) presented
bove.
First of all, Eq. (4) reports that aid contributes to reduce
overty. However, while the sign is favourable, the size of the
oefficient is quite low: if aid per  capita  were doubled, the aver-
ge effect on poverty rates would be a reduction of 8%. That is
ather low, particularly when compared to the eightfold higher
mpact expected on average from economic growth. Surpris-
ngly, in Eq. (3) a negative influence of aid on economic growth
s detected, which seems to support the pessimistic view pre-
ented earlier on. In order to test this result, an interaction term
DA-POLCIV has been added in Eq. (3), aiming at highlighting
he relevance of the governance factor in influencing the effec-
iveness of aid. Along a parsimonious approach, results of such
odification are not reported here; however, it is worth consid-
ring how the positive sign of the coefficient of such interaction
erm remarks the positive influence of a favourable governance
nvironment over aid effectiveness. From Eq. (5) we know that
id is effective on governance, though, as in Eq. (4), once again
he coefficient results lower than in the case of GDP.
All other factors considered seem to play their expected role.
thnic fragmentation is not conducive to a favourable gover-
ance environment and is a constraint towards growth. Openness
owards the international environment, both in political and eco-
omic terms, seems to play a favourable role both in improving
he domestic governance conditions and strengthening the pro-
ess of economic growth.15 The usual negative tropics-growth
ink is confirmed.
15 This result contrasts with the criticism raised in various occasions against
he role that globalization can play on economic growth, particularly in the case
f the poorest countries. It is to be considered that while such issue deserves a
ot of attention, it is not the focus of the present analysis.
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dFinally, of particular relevance for this study is Eq. (2) which
ocuses on the determinants of aid allocation. Poverty does not
eem to be a determinant in this process, as shown by its insignif-
cant coefficient. This goes a long way in support of the frequent
riticism about practices of aid allocation: aid is allocated inde-
endently of needs and, in particular, of poverty levels. The same
s reflected in the case of governance. On the contrary, the highly
ignificant and remarkable coefficient of GDP per  capita  indi-
ates that wealth seems to be taken into account when allocating
id. The sign and size of the coefficient of population support the
oncern raised in a few occasions about the presence of a strong
ize bias in aid allocation towards small countries.16 The consid-
ration that the amount of aid per  capita  seems to be inversely
elated to average GDP hides a few simple but major limitations:
a) it does not take into account the distribution of income and
ealth in general, often quite unequal in developing countries;
b) the number of poor is likely to be higher in a large popu-
ation than in a small one, even when the former has a higher
DP per  capita; (c) needs are not just a matter of number of
oor, but also of depth of poverty – i.e. how poor are the poor.
uch consideration provides a strong hint to explore a bit further
he relevance of poverty in the system and how a more poverty-
fficient – or poverty-focused – allocation of assistance could
ventually improve it. In trying to do so, the system has been
erun after substituting ceteris paribus aid per  capita  with aid per
oor (i.e. ODA is replaced by ODApp). While this is certainly
 step towards a more poverty-focused approach, it is necessary
o consider that poverty is here expressed as poverty-headcount
nd not poverty-gap, since data limitation does not allow to fully
apture the dimension of depth of poverty as advised under (c)
bove. The new results are reported in Table 2.
As expected, the major changes between Tables 1 and 2 refer
o aid and its interactions with other major components of the
ystem. From the new perspective, contrary to previous results,
id seems not to have any influence on governance. At the same
ime, in support of previous results, governance appears not to
16 This can be explained pragmatically as donors’ preference to maximize
he number of countries benefiting of their assistance, or euphemistically as
iminishing compassion returns to poverty for any given country.
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Table 2
The aid-growth-poverty-governance system with aid per poor.
[6] [7] [8] [9]
dep. var. lODAppt5 lGDPt5 lPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt −0.567*** lODAppavg 0.127*** lODAppavg −0.139*** lODAppavg 0.025
1Populationt −0.651*** Latitude −0.013*** lGDPavg −0.614* lGDPavg 0.317***
lGDPt −0.125* Opennesst 0.361*** Constant 8.209*** Latitude −0.026***
POLCIVt −0.031 Ethnic −1.953*** Opennesst 0.540***
Constant 17.662*** Constant 7.342*** Ethnic −0.420*
Constant 2.057***
Pseudo R2 0.650 0.301 0.800 0.315
N. obs. 549 549 549 549
Source: Author’s estimation.
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nfluence aid allocation. Having said that, the main change under
his new perspective refers to the poverty reduction power of aid.
n Eq. (8) the direct poverty reduction power of aid results now
lmost doubled, and in Eq. (7) the direct contribution of aid
owards growth is now positive. In other words, from a more
overty-focused perspective in the allocation of aid, the capac-
ty that aid can play in terms of poverty reduction appears to be
mplified. This is both in direct and indirect – that is, through
rowth – terms. In other words, when poverty is the determi-
ant of aid allocation, aid seems to be effective both for poverty
eduction and for growth.
However, once recognized the positive sign of aid effec-
iveness, it is necessary to remark how weak its power is.
n particular, growth appears to be quite more effective than
id in achieving poverty reduction. Such finding raises the
sual concerns over the mechanisms of aid. This considera-
ion is supported by the negative sign of poverty in Eq. (6),
hich counterintuitively suggests a negative role in influenc-
ng aid allocation (i.e. the more poor people, the less aid per
oor).
In order to test the robustness of the results on aid allocation,
 variation of the model above has been considered. It has been
rgued that most aid goes to deal with social and welfare issues
hich are not captured necessarily via growth absolute poverty
ndicators (Bourguignon and Leipziger, 2006). In this regard
DI can be expected to be more effective in capturing social
nd welfare dimensions of development. Therefore, the model
as been rerun using HDI as a proxy for poverty (rate of correla-
ion: −0.86). Results for revised Eqs. (2) and (6) are reported in
able 3. Among the results, it is remarkable the change of sign
hen shifting aid allocation from a per  capita  to a per  poor  basis.
hile, as expected, a HDI increase is reflected in a decrease of
id per  capita, the opposite is the case when considering aid allo-
ation on a per  poor  basis. This supports the criticism discussed
17arlier on.
At this point it is appropriate to ask whether the various
alls for more cautious aid allocation based on more careful
17 Among other results, it is interesting to consider how replacing poverty with
DI makes governance a significant determinant of aid allocation. However, it
urns insignificant when dealing with aid per poor.
s
i
i
t
h
aFig. 1. Relevance of poverty and governance in the allocation of aid.
ssessment of needs and of absorption capacity have received
ny attention and have they eventually yielded any improvement
n aid effectiveness. The analysis of aid allocation is quite useful
n this regard. Fig. 1 presents the evolution of the Suits index for
he combined allocation of aid from all the DAC donors. The
istribution is considered from both a poverty-based criterion
nd one based on civil and political liberties as proxies for gov-
rnance. The values have been smoothed through a three-year
oving average.
Fig. 1 shows a different progress on the two sides considered:
n both cases moving along a progressive trend, but at different
ace.
Some remarkable improvements have been done during
he past three decades in the allocation of aid according to
he poverty criterion. At the beginning of the eighties the
istribution of aid was quite regressive, but during the past
hree decades has managed to change and reach a moder-
tely progressive set-up, despite some resistance during the
ineties.
At the same time, the distribution of aid according to the
overnance criterion, has been quite stable on a mildly progres-
ive level during most of the period considered before slightly
ncreasing recently its progressivity.
The evolution of progressivity in the allocation of aid accord-
ng to poverty is quite appreciated and it is worth considering that
here is still some ample margin for further improvement. This
ighlights the possibility to further improve the progressivity of
id distribution along both criteria.
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Table 3
HDI and aid allocation.
[2a] [6a]
dep. var. lODAt5 lODAppt5
ind. var. lHDIt −0.458** lHDIt 0.557*
lPopulationt −0.533*** lPopulationt −0.687***
lGDPt −0.469*** lGDPt 0.085
POLCIVt 0.093*** POLCIVt −0.029
Constant 14.896*** Constant 15.088***
Pseudo R2 0.549 0.614
N. obs. 675 413
Source: Author’s estimation
* Significance = 10%.
** Significance = 5%.
*** Significance = 1%.
Table 4
Aid elasticity of poverty.
1980–89 1990–99 2000–08
Aid per capita −0.041 −0.059*** −0.139***
Aid per poor −0.065** −0.132*** −0.194***
Source: Author’s estimation
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Reflecting the considerations just made about the recently
chieved progressivity of aid allocation in terms of poverty, the
ffectiveness of aid in poverty reduction has been re-estimated
ithin sub-periods following the same systemic approach
dopted above. Aid elasticities of poverty – i.e. δpoverty/δODA
oth per  capita  and per  poor  estimated through Eqs. (4) and (8)
espectively – are in Table 4 18 and show a continuous and three-
old increase over the overall period. It is necessary to recognize
ow, despite the favourable trend, such elasticities are still low.
evertheless, a vast room for improvement is still available in
erms of reallocation of aid, mainly on the basis of poverty levels
nd, to a certain extent, on the grounds of conducive governance
nvironment.
Finally, it is necessary to consider how recent and ongoing
hanges in the poverty landscape pose new questions about how
o tackle poverty reduction. Aid effectiveness is a matter not just
f allocating aid, but also of its utilization. The functionality of
 poverty-efficient approach to aid allocation, whether based on
id per  poor  or aid per  capita, is linked to the assumption of
roper aid utilization by the recipient country. The increasing
hare of poor in fragile and middle-income countries highlights
ow the “poor and stable” profile of the ideal aid recipient coun-
ry is no longer valid. It can be argued that in both conditions
 i.e. middle-income and fragile countries – donors will find
t harder to persuade governments to pursue pro-poor  policy
eforms and a poverty-oriented use of foreign assistance. This
alls for a diversified – yet unclear – approach presenting an
mportant area for new research. In any case poverty-focused
llocation on the part of the donors is a necessary first step.
18 All results are reported in Table A1 and Table A2 in the annex.
A.  Conclusions
Aid is going through a series of drastic changes. Its volume is
ncreasing, with new donors appearing on the scene; but aid flows
re also increasingly fragmented and volatile. However, what
eems to remain uncertain and controversial is its effectiveness
n contributing to growth and particularly to poverty reduction.
Our results show that aid is more effective – both for poverty
eduction and for growth – when its allocation is inspired by a
overty-focused perspective. It is possible to identify a direct
nd an indirect contribution provided by aid towards poverty
eduction, the indirect one being mainly channelled through the
ider process of growth. The indirect contribution does not get
xhausted simply through the aid-GDP-poverty link, but it seems
o involve governance as well. In fact, while it seems that gov-
rnance does not influence aid allocation, the analysis provides
ixed results about the influence of aid on governance.
Results show as well how over the past three decades aid
llocation has drastically changed: from highly regressive to
oderately progressive in terms of poverty. On the contrary
he distribution has remained mildly progressive in terms of
overnance.
The drastic improvements in the allocation of aid with regard
o poverty highlight the need to reconsider the analysis of aid
ffectiveness on a per  poor  basis. Under such perspective the aid
lasticity of poverty has increased threefold over the past three
ecades.
Finally, this study highlights the vast amount of room
emaining for further improvement in terms of the reallocation
f aid, mainly on the basis of poverty levels and, to a certain
xtent, on the grounds of conducive governance environment.
he recent changes in the global poverty landscape will make
t harder for donors to promote and support pro-poor  policy
eforms and a poverty-oriented use of foreign assistance in recip-
ent countries. While a new and diversified approach is required
n this regard, donors’ poverty-focused allocation of aid remains
 precondition for improving the effectiveness of aid.nnex.
See Tables A.1 and A.2.
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Table A.1
The evolution of the aid-growth-poverty-governance system.
[2] [3] [4] [5]
1980–89 dep. var. lODAt5 lGDPt5 lPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt 1.523*** lODAavg 0.247** lODAavg −0.041 lODAavg 0.868***
lPopulationt −1.166*** Latitude −0.055*** lGDPavg −0.529*** lGDPavg −0.109
lGDPt −0.273* Opennesst −0.528 Constant 7.356*** Latitude 0.006
POLCIVt −0.118* Ethnic 1.203 Opennesst −3.843***
Constant 19.667*** Constant 7.018*** Ethnic 10.358***
Constant 0.836
Pseudo R2 0.913 0.604 0.898 0.744
N. obs. 23 23 23 23
1990–99 dep. var. lODAt5 lGDPt5 lPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt 0.061 lODAavg −0.253 lODAavg −0.059*** lODAavg 0.173***
lPopulationt −0.632*** Latitude −0.015*** lGDPavg −0.693*** lGDPavg 0.382***
lGDPt −0.483*** Opennesst 0.654*** Constant 8.398*** Latitude −0.026***
POLCIVt 0.013 Ethnic −1.683*** Opennesst 0.475***
Constant 16.305*** Constant 8.415*** Ethnic −0.345
Constant 1.106
Pseudo R2 0.628 0.388 0.768 0.348
N. obs. 321 321 321 321
2000–08 dep. var. lODAt5 GDPt5 IPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt −0.117 lODAavg −0.483*** lODAavg −0.139*** lODAavg 0.060
lPopulationt −0.540*** Latitude −0.009*** lGDPavg −0.749*** lGDPavg 0.301***
lGDPt −0.737*** Opennesst 0.934*** Constant 8.931*** Latitude −0.027***
POLCIVt 0.057 Ethnic −1.571*** Opennesst 0.814***
Constant 16.835*** Constant 8.243*** Ethnic −0.494
Constant 1.949**
Pseudo R2 0.582 0.478 0.741 0.354
N. obs. 205 205 205 205
Source: Author’s estimation
* Significance = 10%.
** Significance = 5%.
*** Significance = 1%.
A.
 D
e
 M
atteis
 /
 Review
 of
 D
evelopm
ent
 Finance
 3
 (2013)
 51–60
 
59
Table A.2
The evolution of the aid-growth-poverty-governance system with aid per poor.
[6] [7] [8] [9]
1980–89 dep. var. lODAppt5 lGDPt5 lPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt 1.011*** lODAppavg 0.308*** lODAppavg −0.065** lODAppavg 0.838***
lPopulationt −1.219*** Latitude −0.042*** lGDPavg −0.492*** lGDPavg −0.527**
lGDPt −0.012 Opennesst −0.752 Constant 7.192*** Latitude 0.005
POLCIVt −0.151** Ethnic 1.520 Opennesst −4.041***
Constant 21.934*** Constant 6.387*** Ethnic 10.388***
Constant 3.087*
Pseudo R2 0.933 0.714 0.906 0.743
N. obs. 23 23 23 23
1990–99 dep. var. lODAppt5 lGDPt5 lPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt −0.371*** lODAppavg 0.142*** lODAppavg −0.132*** lODAppavg 0.079
lPopulationt −0.664*** Latitude −0.013*** lGDPavg −0.613*** lGDPavg 0.290***
lGDPt 0.050 Opennesst 0.453*** Constant 8.204*** Latitude −0.026***
POLCIVt −0.037 Ethnic −1.796*** Opennesst 0.515***
Constant 16.042*** Constant 7.248*** Ethnic −0.353
Constant 1.908***
Pseudo R2 0.644 0.351 0.806 0.336
N. obs. 320 320 320 320
2000–08 dep. var. lODAppt5 lGDPt5 lPovertyt5 POLCIVt5
ind. var. lPovertyt −1.089*** lODAppavg −0.021 lODAppavg −0.194*** lODAppavg 0.026
lPopulationt −0.556*** Latitude −0.011*** lGDPavg −0.637*** lGDPavg 0.279***
lGDPt −0.569*** Opennesst 0.718*** Constant 8.522*** Latitude −0.027***
POLCIVt −0.008 Ethnic −2.199*** Opennesst 0.833***
Constant 20.751*** Constant 7.545*** Ethnic −0.449
Constant 2.126***
Pseudo R2 0.587 0.306 0.792 0.358
N. obs. 206 206 206 206
Source: Author’s estimation.
* Significance = 10%.
** Significance = 5%.
*** Significance = 1%.
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